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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Case No. 6879

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These cases involve appeals from judgments entered
in favor of the Eureka Lilly Consolidated Mining Company, Tintic Standard Mining Company, Montana Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, Chief Consolidated
Mining Company, Colorado Consolidated Mines Company, Eureka Bullion Mining Company, U. S. Smelting,
Refining and Mining Company, International Smelting
and Refining Company, National Tunnel and Mines Company, Ohio Copper Company of Utah and the Combined
Metals Reduction Company, in actions brought by the
respective companies against the appellants herein in the
District Court of Utah. The issues in all cases being the
same, the causes were consolidated for trial (Rec. 89-90).
The trial court without a jury heard the cases. The
parties submitted written stipulations in lieu of testimony
(Rec. 89-90). The court gave judgment for the plaintiff
in each case (Rec. 91). On appeal the points raised with
respect to each case being the same, the causes have been
consolidated for purpose of printing the record, submitting the brief and argument before the court.
Appellant in its brief will refer to the record in
the case of the Combined Metals Reduction Company
vs. State Tax Commission, No. 6869, exclusively, except
as otherwise indicated.
The cases arise out of the payment under protest, of
certain occupation taxes to the State of Utah by the respondents, hereinafter referred to as the Mining Companies. Section 80-5-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides in part that:
2

''

* * * every person engaged in the business
of mining or producing ore containing gold, silver,
copper, lead, iron, zinc or other valuable metal in
this state, shall pay to the State of Utah an occupation tax equal to 1 per cent of the gross
amount received for or the gross value of the
metalliferous ore sold which tax shall he in addition to all other taxes provided by law * * *. ''
During the calender year 1943 the Mining Companies, in addition to the amounts received from private
enterprise for the sale or other disposal of their ores, also
received certain sums of money from the Federal Government through Metals Reserve Company, pursuant to a
"premium payment program" (Rec. 73). In assessing
said occupation tax, the State Tax Commission of Utah
included in the ''gross amount received for or the gross
value of metalliferous ore sold," the "premium payments" received by each of the Mining Companies. The
Companies, with respect to that portion of the tax attributable to the respective amounts received from Metals
Reserve Company, paid the same under protest, and
brought suit in the District Court of Utah in and for Salt
Lake County to recover the amount so paid. The Companies alleged, in substance and effect, that the amounts
received by them from Metals Reserve Company were
in no manner related to the sale or other disposition of
the various ores, without regard to the same, and were
in no wise a part of the value of such ores; that the assessments were an immediate and direct and substantial
mterference with, and burden upon, the National Government and the exercise by the National Government of its
legislative function of prosecuting war; that said assess-
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ments were wholly in excess of the power of appellants
and were an arbitrary usurpation of power and the
taking of property of the respective companies without
due process of law, in violation of Section 1 of the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
In answer to the complaints, it was alleged in substance and effect that the amounts received by the Mining
Companies from the Federal Government through Metals
Reserve Company were paid pursuant to a ''premium
price plan" sponsored by the said Metals Reserve Company; that in accordance with such plan Metals Reserve
Company paid ''premium prices'' for production of copper, lead and zinc, in excess of certain quotas established
by the War Production Board and the Office of Price
Administration, said premium prices being based on l7c
per pound for copper, llc per pound for zinc, 91Jtc per
pound for lead. Said program was fully set forth in the
Affirmative Defense filed by appellants in each case
(Rec. 16-21). From the facts set forth in appellants'
answer in each case, appellants further alleged that the
amounts received by each of the Companies from the
Metals Reserve Company, presented a part of the ''gross
amount received for or the gross value of'' the various
metalliferous ores sold by the respective Mining Companies during the calender year 1943 (Rec. 21), and
denied that the inclusion of such amounts as a part of the
"gross amount" was an interference with or burden upon
the National Government in its function of prosecuting
4

the war or that the same was without authority of law or
a taking of property without due process of law as alleged in plaintiff's complaint (Rec. 3).
Upon the pleadings, the issues of law to be determined are: (1.) whether the taxation of the premium payments was authorized by Utah law, and (2.) whether the
taxation of such payments was a taxation of the means
used by the Federal Government in the prosecution of the
war and consequently beyond the powers of the state to
make a direct levy upon government activities or facilities.
In the trial of the causes, counsel for the respective
parties introduced a statement of facts and a compilation
of what was deemed to be the pertinent statutes and orders and announcements of the various Federal Agencies.
The court in rendering its decisions held:
''I am of the opinion that the premiums or bonus
paid by Metals Reserve Company cannot, under the
statutes of the State of Utah involved, be considered a
part of the 'gross proceeds' of bona fide sales of the
metal products of plaintiff mining companies, but that
such payments constitute an inducement to increase production, adding nothing to the intrinsic value of the metal
that would in any way affect its sale price on a free and
open market to any independent and unhampered purchaser. The State Tax Commission of Utah, in the
opinion of this court, had no authority to levy or collect
an occupational tax from the plaintiff mining, including
in the base used for such purposes, the subsidy payments
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paid to the plaintiff corporations by the United States
Government.''
From the judgment in each case, these appeals were
taken (Rec. 95).
SPECIFICATION OF POINTS RELIED UPON
For the purpose of argument, appellants have
grouped their statement of points under two general
headings:
(1) The amounts received by the respective Mining
Companies from Metals Reserve Company were properly
included as a part of the ''gross amount received for or
the gross value of metalliferous ore sold" within the
meaning and contemplation of the Utah statutes. (2)
The inclusion thereof was not prohibited by the State or
Federal Constitutution8.
ARGUMENT I
The occupation tax imposed by Section 80-5-66, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, is one per cent of the "gross
amount received for or the gross value of metalliferous
ore sold.'' The problem, therefore, is whether the
amounts received by the respective Mining Companies
from Metals Reserve Company, in connection with the
production and sale of the ores produced by the respective Mining Companies in the calender year 1943, forms a
part of such ''gross amount received for or gross value
of" such metalliferous ores. In considering this point,
we call the court's attention to the following pertinent
facts relative to the "premium payment plan" (Rec. 73).
1. The Office of Price Administration, on or about
6

August 2, 1941, issued its price schedule No. 15 whereby
it was provided that on and after February 1, 1942, no
person should sell, offer to sell, deliver or transfer and no
person should buy, offer to buy, or accept delivery of copper at a price higher than 12c per pound (Hec. 39). At or
about the same time price schedules No. 69 and No. 81
were issued with respect to lead and zinc whereby it was
provided that on and after the effective date (January
15, 1942, for lead, and January 28, 1942, for zinc) no person should sell, offer to sell, deliver or transfer and no
person should buy, offer to buy, or accept delivery of
primary lead or primary slab zinc in excess of the ceiling
prices set forth in the schedules, to-wit: 6Y2 c per pound
for lead and 8~c per pound for zinc (Rec. 42-44).
2. It was immediately apparent, however, that at the
ceiling prices fixed by the Office of Price Administration,
very little of these highly critical ores would be produced
and put at the disposal of the Federal Government in
connection with its war program. It was, therefore, announced on January 12, 1942, by the Federal Loan Administrator, the Honorable Jesse Jones, that at the re- . · '~·
quest of the OPM and OP A, Metals Reserve Company
would ''for a period of two and one-half years from February 1, 1942, pay 11 cents per pound East St. Louis for
zinc, 9~ cents per pound New York for lead, and 17 cents
per pound Connecticut Valley for copper, for increases
above 1941 production governed by quotas to be fixed.''
3. This "premium price plan," as more fully outlined by a joint statement issued on February 9, 1942, by
the War Production Board and the Office of Price Ad7

ministration, provides that the plan is "one of the steps
taken to increase production;'' that premium prices based
on 17c per pound for copper, llc per pound for zinc, and
9%c per pound for lead, would be paid in excess of quotas
to be established jointly by the War Production Board
and the Office of Price Administration; that in general,
quotas would be established at the normal production rate
for 1941, but that in special cases different quotas would
be fixed, depending upon individual circumstances (Rec .
. 15). The premium payments were made to respondent
/herein upon the basis of a fixed percentage of total metal
1 content of the ores or concentrates produced, based upon
1
. the normal metal recovery for such ores or concentrates.
: (Rec. 47-48.)
4. The amount actually to be paid by Metals Reserve
Company is set forth in the'' Program for Premium Payments by Metals Rese.rve Company on Production of Copper, Lead and Zinc in Excess of Monthly Production
Quotas" issued March 7, 1942. It is therein stated that
Metals Reserve Company would pay the ''difference between the respective ceiling prices for the materials involved and the equivalent of 17c per pound Connecticut
Valley for copper, 91;;'tc per pound New York for lead and
llc per pound East St. Louis for zinc.'' The program
also provides that various smelting companies throughout the United States would be designated as agents for
Metals Reserve Company in connection with the making
of the premium payments. (Rec. 48) Thus the producer
J would receive the ceiling prices for his ores from the
1 smelter to which they were shipped and at the same time
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would receive from Metals Reserve Company through the ;·
very same smelter the premium payments for his ores 1
produced in excess of quota.
5. 'l'he producer in each case was guaranteed by
Metals Reserve Company the sum of 17c per pound for
copper, 9%c per pound for lead, and llc per pound for
zinc until July 31, 1945, for all of such ores produced in
excess of quota unless the National Emergency should
terminate prior thereto, in which case notice of termination of the program was required to be given thirty
days in advance. 'l'hereupon adjustments would be made
with each producer as in said program set forth (Rec.
49). However, as stated above, Metals Reserve Company
paid only the amount in excess of the ceiling price, allowing the smelter or processor to pay such ceiling price to
the producer.
6. In order to obtain payment of the premiums
quoted, each producer, representing himself as eligible
for such premium payment must" (1.) cause the smelting
company to which he ships to be furnished, as agent for
Metals Reserve Company, with a sworn producer's affidavit * * * showing, among other things, the amount of
material in excess of quota delivered during the month
covered by such affidavit for which he has been paid or
will be paid and on which he is eligible for a premium,
and (2.) cause the smelting company to be furnished with
all necessary information so as to enable it to supply
Metals Reserve Company with a statement setting out all
data required for the making of the premium payments''
(Rec. 49).
9

7. The producer, in the affidavit filed with the
smelting company, sets out that he "produced, and delivered for sale during the month'' mentioned to the
particular smelting or refining company the amount of
material listed (Rec. 52).
8. Following the receipt of the foregoing affidavit,
together with the statement of its agent, Metals Reserve
Company agreed to make payment of the premiums
promptly to the producer (Rec. 4D).
9. In order to relieve the Mining Companies from
the provisions of price schedules Nos. 15, 69 and 81 hereinbefore referred to, prohibiting sales or deliveries of
copper, lead or zinc at prices higher than maxium prices
fixed, the Office of Price Administration issued its supplementary regulation No. 4 exempting from the general
maximum price regulation "sales or deliveries" of metallic copper, lead, or zinc, or of ores or concentrates containing copper, lead or zinc, to the Metals Reserve Company, or its duly authorized agent or agents, pursuant to
the premium ~price plan announced hy the Federal Loan
Agency, the War Production Board, and the Office of
Price Administration.''
10. Metals Reserve Company was originally incorporated pursuant to Section 5 (d) of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation Act to "produce, acquire, carry,
sell, or otherwise deal in strategic and critical materials."
Section 5 (d) of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
when requested by the Federal Loan Administrator, with
the approval of the President, to create corporations with
power "to produce, acquire, carry, sell or otherwise deal
10

11. Net Proceeds Valuation Reported by Protesting Companies and Valuations Assessed by Tax
Commission, Tax Assessment for 1944, Operations for 1943
Reported Basis
for
Computation
of Tax

Metal
Premium
Payments

Assessment
Basis for
Computation
of Tax

Occupation
Tax
Reported

Occupation
Tax
Assessed

Chief Consolidated Mining Co. ____________ $ 105,227.92 $492,238.84 $ 597,466.76 $ 1,052.28 $ 5,974.67
Colorado Consolidated Mines Co. __________
13,758.12
15.38
15,296.37
152.96
1,538.25
Combined Metals Reduction Co.407,180.93
1,689.71
4,071.81
Butterfield Mine ------------------------------ 168,971.12 238,209.81
Combined Metals Reduction Co.642,830.82
3,706.80
6,428.31
Calumet Mine ---------------------------------- 370,679.96 272,150.86
Eagle & Blue Bell Mining Co. ________________ 31,293.06
1,439.39
32,732.45
312.93
327.32
Eureka Bullion Mining Co. ____________________ 71,332.77
7,144.87
78,477.64
713.33
784.78
Eureka Lilly Cons. Mining Co. ______________ 24,565.19
10,792.25
245.65
35,357.44
353.57
International Smelting Co.Tintic Bullion Mine__________________________ 294,910.16
25,892.69
320,802.85
2,949.10
3,208.03
Montana Bingham Cons. Mining Co. ___
32,958.59
97,130.02
641.71
64,171.43
971.30
National Tunnel & Mines Co. ________________ 322,949.32 886,975.64 1,209,924.96
3,229.49 12,099.25
Niagara Mining Co. ________________________________ 30,358.95
1,227.85
31,586.80
303.59
315.87
Ohio Copper Co. of Utah ________________________ 234,027.18 142,889.45
376,916.63
2,300.46
3,729.36
Park Utah Cons. Mines Co. ____________________ 740,805.95 905,506.66 1,646,312.61
7,408.06 16,463.13
Tin tic Standard Mining Co. _________________ 640,760.99 440,494.16 1,081,255.15
6,407.61 10,812.55
U. S. Smelting Co.Hidden Treasure Mine ___________________ 124,693.74
24,489.40
149,183.14
1,246.94
1,491.83
U. S. Smelting Co.U.S. & Lark Mine ____________________________ 3,575,831.45
99,078.56 3,674,910.01 35,758.31 36,749.10

m strategic and critical materials."

The Act further

authorizes any corporation so created" to make payments
against the purchase price to be paid for strategic and
critical materials in advance of the delivery of such materials.'' Thereafter the premium price program hereinabove outlined was sponsored and carried on by Metals
Reserve Company.

In our opinion, the mere statement that respondents
herein received the respective amounts set forth from
private industry for their ores and the additional amount
for such ores from Metals Reserve Company should,
when considered in connection with the language of
Section 80-5-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, hereinbefore
set out, be sufficient ground to justify the Tax Commission in combining both of such sums so received by the
respective Mining Companies for the purpose of fixing
the occupation tax. However, because of Respondents'
contentions to the effect that the amounts received from
Metals Reserve Company were and are not part of the
"gross amount received" for their ores, and that such
amounts have no relation to the sale or disposition of the
ores or to their value, but are mere gifts from the Federal
Government to the producer, we have deemed it expedient
to make the foregoing statement of facts indicating the
picture under which these premium payments are made.
Such statement, together with other additional facts as
may be necessary, will be referred to in the course of
the appellants' argnment in meeting the contentions of
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Respondents as have been urged throughout the instant
proceedings.

It is contended first, that because the premium payments do not form a part of the amount received by the
producer from the immediate purchaser in private industry of such ores at the time such ores are sold, such
premium payments are not to be included within the
language "gross amount received for". However, as we
view the matter, the actual amount of money received at '
the time of sale is not the criterion for determining the
amount of the tax. r.l'he requirement in the statute that
the tax be levied upon the ''gross amount'' received for
the ores that have been sold fixes the time of saie as the
instant or point of tjme at which the occupation tax is to
accrue or become fixed. lt is not merely what the producer may receive at the time title passes but what
the ''gross amount'' is which the producer has received or has become entitled to receive on account
of the ores up to the time of such sale. It could
hardly be contended that if the smelter paid to the producers a fixed amount at the time the ores are produced
and another additional amount at the time the ores are
delivered to the smelters under the contract of sale (at
which time title to the same would pass from the producer to the smelter) that the total amount of money thus
paid and received would not he the ''gross amount''
received for such ore.
The case of Vause & Striegel, Inc., vs. McKibbin, 379
Ill. 169; 39 NE (2d) 1006 illustrates this principle very
well. The Retailers Occupation Tax Act of Illinois im13

posed an occupation tax upon retailers upon the "gross
receipts" from the sales of tangible personal property.
As defined in the statute, "gross receipts" meant the
total selling price or the amount of the sales of such tangible personal property. Selling price was also defined as
"the consideration for a sale valued in money, whether
received in money or otherwise, including cash, credit,
services and property of every kind or nature and shall
be determined, without any deduction on account of the
cost of the property sold, cost of the materials used, labor
or service cost, or any other expense whatsoever." Plaintiffs in that case were engaged in the business of selling
tangible personal property at retail. Their items were
priced in advance and advertised in newspapers, circulars
and by price tags. When a customer appeared and made
a purchase of an article at the price quoted or indicated,
he was advised that in addition he would be charged at
the rate of 3c for every dollar of purchase to cover the
occupation tax which the retailer had to pay. In some
instances, if the customer refused to pay the additional
amount, the sale was consummated without such payment
being made. The narrow issue involved in the case was
whether the retailer must pay his occupation tax "upon
$1.03 or $1 where he prices the same article at $1 but receives in payment therefor $1.03, the additional three
cents being designated, as between the retailer and consumer, a payment of tax.'' In determining this question
the Supreme Court of Illinois held :
''Plaintiff insists that the additional charge to
cover the occupation tax received by them is a
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separate item and not a part of the true selling
price. It is pointed out that they have transacted
their sales and received the additional three cents
from the consumer subsequent to the sale--not
as a part of the selling price. The plain purpose
of the Retailer's Occupation Tax Act to exact the
tax upon all those engaged in the business of selling at retail in this State cannot be so readily circumvented and payment of the tax so easily evaded. Conceding that retailers and their customers,
in some transactions, as disclosed by the stipulated facts, make a distinction between (1) the
;noney paid for the property transferred and (2)
the added charge on account of the retailer's occupation tax, the concession cannot aid them until
and unless the legislature makes the same distinction. The mere fact that the retailer and the
consumer may, by a particular form of billing,
denominate the three cents additional charge in
one instance a tax and in another a part of the
selling price is not decisive. Manifestly, the State
cannot be deprived of the tax upon tho actual selling price irrespective of the form of invoice agreed upon by a retailer and the purchaser from
}lim. Again, so far as the consumer is concerned,
the selling price is $1.03, irrespective of the manner of bookkeeping. If a retailer elects to add the
three cents exacted of him by the law to the original selling price of $1 he is not in a position to
complain when the State demands that he pay a
tax on the amount actually received by him from
the consumer, namely $1.03. In short, where a
retailer adds the tax which he is required to pay,
to the purchase price of the merchandise sold by
him, he must pay the tax on the total amount received by him from the consumer. The tenuous
distinction urged by plaintiffs cannot be sustained.
It follows, necessarily, that rule No. 20 of the De-
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partment of Finance, to the extent challenged, is
valid.''
Likewise, in the instant matters, so far as Respondents are concerned, the ''gross amoup.t'' received
for their ores is the combined amount received from the
smelter or processor and the Metals Reserve Company.
Conversely, in the case of the State vs. Armson,-Minn. ________ , 207 N. W. 732, involving the occupation tax
statute of the State of Minnesota, the contracts for the
sale of ore provided for payments to be made for ore
monthly as the ore was shipped. Since no deliveries
could be made during the winter months, the purchaser
often paid for ore before it was delivered . In such cases
the contract for purchase provided that the purchaser
should have a discount from the purchase price normally
received. Holding that the discount did not affect the
value of the ore, the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated:
"* * * in no event do these discounts affect
either the value or the market price of the ore.
They represent interest on money paid before it
is due, or rather an allowance on the purchase
price for the advantage the seller gains by receiving his money in advance.''
As a matter of fact, under the provisions of our occupation tax statute (Section 80-5-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) a sale is not necessary, in all cases, in order
to fix the time or moment at which the occupation tax
attaches. Subdivision (b) of Section 80-5-66 provides
that in those instances where the ores are treated at a
mill, smelter or reduction works owned by the producer
of the ores and which said mill, smelter or reduction
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works also receives ores from independent sources ''such
disposal (meaning the disposal of the ores to the mill,
smelter or reduction works) shall be treated as a sale
within the meaning of this section for the purpose of
determining gross proceeds or otherwise.'' We also observe in the language just quoted that the term "gross
proceeds'' is used synonymously with ''gross amount received for." The tax being determined as of the time
said ores are disposed of to the mill, smelter or reduction
works, the amount which the producer has received or
will be entitled to receive on account of said ores in the
crude state they are in would be the determining factor
in fixing the ''gross amount'' or ''gross proceeds'' received from such ores. 'l'oo, the terms ''gross proceeds''
and "net proceeds" as used elsewhere in the taxing statutes of the State of Utah (Section 80-5-57, U. C. A. 1943)
have been defined by our state Supreme Court. In the
case of Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Company v. Spry,
16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382, the Court held:
''By the term 'net annual proceeds of the mine'
is meant what is annually realized /Tom the product of' the mine (gro::os proceeds), over and above
all the costs and expenses of obtaining such proceeds and converting the same into money."
(Italics added).
This definition of "proceeds" was subsequently
quoted with approval by U. S. District Court in the case
of Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Company, 294
Fed. 199.
Applying the foregoing principles it would appear
that the gross amount upon which a producer in the
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foregoing situation would be required to pay an occupation tax, would be the amount of premium payment
received from Metals Reserve Company at the time such
ores are disposed of to the mill, smelter or other reduction works, plus the ceiling prices for the respective
ores (which prices the producer would be entitled to
receive from the purchaser in private industry of the
ores produced).
The term ''gross'' as used in statutes taxing ''gross
income,'' ''gross premiums,'' etc., has been defined by
numerous courts under varying conditions and circumstances. For instance, in the case of State v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814, where the statute
imposed a tax of 7 per cent on the ''gross receipts'' of the
corporation, the court held that the word "gross" meant
the ''entire amount, the total sum, without any deduction
of any kind'' and included receipts derived by the company for transporting interstate commerce as well as
receipts derived from intrastate commerce. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Rouillard, ______ N. H. ______ ,
24 Atl. 2d 264, a statute imposing a tax of 2 per cent
upon the ''gross premiums received'' was construed by
the court in the following language:
"There is nothing in the statute to indicate
that the word 'gross' is not to he given its usual
meaning of 'whole; entire; total; without deduction'."
Again in Hartford Electric Light Company v.
McLaughlin, 131 Conn. 1, 37 Atl. 2d 361, the court construed the meaning of a statute imposing a tax upon
"gross earnings from operations" as follows:
18

''When we speak of the 'gross earnings' of
a person or corporation, we mean the entire earnings of such person or corporation from the
business or operations to which we refer.''
In the case of Hawaii Consolidated Ry. Ltd. v.
William Borthwick, 34 Hawaii 269, the court was concerned with the meaning of the term "gross" as used
in connection with the income tax statute. The court
there stated:
"As an adjective qualifying the term 'income'
the word 'gross' implies income from any and all
sources." (Italics added.)
It has also been pointed out by the Mining Companies throughout these tax proceedings that the "premium payments'' were made by Metals Reserve Company although the title to the ores involved was transferred elsewhere-to the smelter or other processor in
accordance with the smelter contracts or other contracts
under which such ores were, in fact, sold. Such a fact, in
view of the conditions existing under which these ores
are disposed of by the producers cannot alter or affect
the proposition that all monies received both from the
Federal Government and from private industry form a
part of the "gross amount" or "gross proceeds" derived from the production and disposition of the ores.
The P'ederal Government, through its various agencies, is so intimately and intricately connected with the
producing, refining, processing, fabricating, and distributing such ores, and becomes the ultimate purchaser and
consumer of such a large part thereof, that any monies
paid by it to the producer on account of the ores pro-
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duced cannot be distinguished or separated from any
amounts otherwise received in connection with such ores.
The producer is called upon by the Government to produce more and more ores for the war effort. As to such
production, however, the Office of Price Administration
fixes a ceiling price at which such ores are to be sold.
The Government then steps in and agrees to pay the
producers an additional amount which plan the Office
of Price Administration approves by supplementary regulation. The smelters are made the agents of the Federal
Government for the purpose of receiving the ores and
paying the premium prices. The producers are required
to dispose of their ores at the designated smelters before
such premium prices will be paid. The smelters or other
processing plants are prohibited from disposing of the
refined ores or metals except upon allocation by the War
Production Board as successor to the Supply Priorities
and Allocations Board. No dealer or refiner is permitted
to deliver copper to any person requesting such delivery
without the presentation of an allocation certificate.
Similar requirements are imposed with respect to lead
and zinc, and finally the Federal Government becomes
the ultimate consumer of most, if not practically all, of
the ores in the form of finished products such as bullets,
machine guns, tanks, trucks, ships and other products
used in the prosecution of the war.
It is admitted that the Federal Government pays
the premium prices to the producers in order to obtain
increased production of the ores involved, which increased production the Government must have to prose-
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cute the war. The Government, through the premmm
prices, pays only for what it gets. As a matter of fact
it gets a good deal more of the ore production than
that on which the premium prices are actually paid. It
has been estimated how much the Government has saved
in actual dollars and cents by the program hereinbefore
outlined, it being recognized that the Government is the
ultimate purchaser and consumer of most of the ores
produced. Recently the question of continuing the premium payment program for another year was before
Congress. In a speech before the House of Representatives, Congressman Patman from Texas produced two
tables or charts showing the production of the respective
ores, the cost at ceiling prices, the premiums paid, the
total thus paid for such ores, the amount that would
have otherwise been required to be paid for such ores
without the premium payment program, and the savings
thus effected. For the year 1943, the year here in question, savings of $84,356,000.00 were made on the production of copper, $14,702,200.00 on the production of
lead, and $48,605,700.00 on the production of zinc, or a
total of $147,663,900.00 on the production of all three
such metals. See Congressional Record Volume 91, No.
18, page A381 (January 31, 1945). vVe further quote
from his speech as follows :
"At my request, the Office of Price Administration has prepared some charts on this subject. One of these tabulations shows the actual
amount of premiums disbursed by the Government in connection with the production of each
one of these three metals; the other tabulation
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shows the provable, computable savings to the
Nation-on a conservative basis-in reference to
the metals themselves before use for fabrication
purposes. I feel that these charts are conservativeiy computed because, for example, 17 cents
per pound is used as a possible comparative price
which copper might have sold for in the absence
of this premium plan whereas, during the last
war, copper actually sold as high as 37 cents a
pound during 1917 and averaged, as stated, more
than 29 cents a pound during that year. If we
had used the 1917 average figures the estimated
savings of today would run into many, many
billions of dollars.
'' l endeavored also to have prepared tabulations which '.Vould show the savings to the Nation
in the cost of finished products which are made
from these three metals, but found that the
preparation of that additional data would involve
untold research, much time of valuable employees,
and would impose too great a burden on industry
at this time. However, from responsible sources
in both industry and Government, I get information which convinces me that the savings to
both governmental and civilian purchasers of
these finished products is at least $1,500,000,000.
Beyond this, there is the additional saving in
scrap metal costs which follow the lower costs of
the basic metals themselves.''
To the same effect is a speech, delivered by Senator Murdock of Utah before the Senate, contained in
the Congressional Record, Volume 91, No. 49, pages
2301, 2309 (March 15, 1945). We quote from his speech
as follows:
''From the viewpoint of price control, the
plan has avoided the necessity for general price
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mcreases for the commodities with a consequent
over-all savings to the Government, which, being
the purchaser in one form or another of a large
part of the production of the metals under war
conditions, would have had to absorb such price
increases.''
The term "gross amount received for" as set forth
m Section 80-5-66, and hereinbefore discussed is used
in connection with the term ''or gross value of.'' That
is to say, the language of the statute reads "the gross
amount received for or the gross value of" the ores.
Respondents therefore argue that the "gross amount"
cannot be considered to be more than the ''gross value'';
that the "gross value" of the ores in question is no
more than the "market value"; that the "market value"
is fixed by the ceiling prices for the respective ores, so
that the premium payments made are not reflected in
the ''gross amount received for or gross value of'' the
ores in question. The term value is defined by our
statute (Section 80-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) to
mean ''the amount to which the property would be taken
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.''
Again, in the case of State vs. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50
P. 615, our Supreme Court in construing the word
"value" as used in the statute requiring that all property shall be assessed "according to its value in money"
held:

"It is evident that the term 'according to its
value in money' means that all property shall be
valued, for the purpose of assessment, as near
as is reasonably practicable, at its full cash value;
in other words, that the valuation for assess-
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ment and taxation shall be, as near as reasonably
practicable, equal to the cash price for which the
property valued would sell in open market, for
this is doubtless the correct test of the value of
property."
With reference to the situation presented in the
instant matters, however, we do not feel that the foregoing tests of value can properly be applied. There can
be no test of determining a ''fair market value'' when
there is no "open" or "fair" market. At the present
time the market is closed with respect to competitive
bidding in buying and selling. Each producer of copper,
lead and zinc is guaranteed a specific amount by the
Federal Government, part of which is to be paid by the
smelting company or other immediate purchaser and the
balance by the Federal Government through the Metals
Reserve Company, but in order to receive the same the
producer must ship its ores to the smelter designated
by Metals Reserve Company. It cannot go to an "open
market'' and seek a competitive price.
Nor, can the amount for which the ores would be
taken in payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor,
be used as a criterion for the reason that a solvent debtor
would not permit his ores to be taken by a creditor in
payment of a debt for less than the ceiling price plus the
amount of premium payments to which such debtorproducer would be entitled. At the same time, it is
doubtful whether a creditor would care to take such
ores at that price (being the total amount received for
such ores as herein indicated) for the reason that such
creditor may not be eligible to receive the premium pay24

ments to which the debtor-producer would be entitled.
Thus to deprive the debtor-producer of the ores might
deprive both him and the creditor of the premium payments. It is also questionable whether, under the allocation program as hereinbefore set forth such ores could,
in fact, be taken in payment of any debt. If, in fact, they .
were so taken, they would be subject to the same restrictions as to use or sale as all other ores and, therefore, would be of no practical value to a creditor. For
this reason we cannot see how, under any reasonable
hypothesis, it might be argued that the value of the
ores here in question must be determined by the ceiling
price. The value of the ores to the producer is the
amount he can receive for them-from Metals Reserve
Company and from the smelter or other private purchaser. He would not part with them for less, nor would
he have in the original instance mined them except for
the guarantee given by Metals Reserve Company as to
the total amount which he would receive therefor.
Definitions of value which more nearly apply to the
situation here involved are as follows:
''A fair return in money, goods, services, etc.,
for something exchanged; that which is considered
an equivalent in worth."-Webster's New International Dictionary.
'' 'Value' is what the thing will bring today in
exploitation or exchange under some presently
possible conditions. "-Babbit vs. Read, C. C. A.
(2nd) 236 F. 42, 47.
In his Book, "The Valuation of Property," Professor James C. Bonbright says: "The value of prop-

25

erty is nothing but the value of an opportunity to
derive future profits or other services.'' We submit
· that the value of the ore here in question is the total
; amount to which, under the artificial conditions existing
as imposed by the Federal Government, the producer
is in all events entitled to receive for such ore, irrespective of the source from which such money is derived.
This value is linked with the entire production of
the mine and not with any particular pound of ore or
the over-quota portion of the ores produced. The producer must furnish his quota before he is entitled to
receive the premiums on the extra production. Therefore, the ores up to the amount of the quota are imbued
with a value other than the actual ceiling price, because,
without them, premium prices could not be received for
over-production ores. A similar situation exists with
respect to the amount received by a laborer for his services. In most instances, workmen are paid at an hourly
rate for so many hours a week (similar to the quota
prescribed for the Respondents herein). However, for
his services in excess of the stipulated number of hours,
the workman receives once and a half or twice the
amount which he received for the regular or normal
hours of service. As a matter of common knowledge,
respondents herein pay their workmen upon such a basis.
Certainly, the extra amount received by the workman
for overtime is as much a part of the "gross amount"
or "gross value" of his services as the money received
for regular time. Nor is he entitled to any overtime
pay until he has worked in a given week the full normal
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time prescribed. Respondents, undoubtedly, pay a considerable amount of overtime to workmen in order to
produce the ores in excess of quota on which they receive
the premium payml:'nts. .Just as the total amount received by the workmen, including overtime, forms a part
of his gross receipts for income tax purposes and just
as the gross amount received by the respective Mining
Companies, including premium payments, forms a part
of the gross receipts of such Mining Companies for
income or corporate franchise tax purposes under both
State and Federal statutes, so we believe must such
gross amount, including premium payments, be reported
for the purpose of making the occupation tax assessment herein-which was done in each case by the State
Tax Commission.
As hereinbefore indicated, such premium payments
are definitely recognized as a part of the "gross amount
received for or gross value of" the respective ores by
the Federal Government when it was deemed necessary
by the Office of Price Administration to authorize the
sale or delivery of the metals pursuant to the premium
price plan as an exception to the ceiling prices imposed.
Insofar as ''gross value'' goes, were it not for the restrictions placed by the Federal Government upon the
sale or delivery of copper, lead, and zinc ores, the
amount which might well be received on an ''open
market" would be far in excess of the total amount now
received. See remarks of Representative Patman hereinbefore referred to.
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It was upon such considerations as those expressed
by Representative Patman and Senator Murdock, calling attention to the savings which had resulted to the
Federal Government by reason of the premium payment
plan, which caused Congress to pass an act extending
the program until .June 30, 1946 ''on the same terms
as heretofore, except that all classes of premiums shall
be non-cancellable unless necessary in order to make
individual adjustments of income to specific mines''
(Senate Bill 502).
It has also been urged that the premium payments
received by Respondents herein are mere gifts and hence
not a part of the ''gross amount received for or gross
value of" the various ores. The District Court in its
oral decision, characterized the payments as constituting
an inducement to increase production adding nothing to
the intrinsic value of the metal. The court said in the
case of Helvering v. Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Co.
(C. C. A. 4th) 93 Fed. (2nd) 875:
''The amount received by taxpayer from the
state was in no sense a gift, which is a transfer
without consideration. Noel v. Parrott, 4 Cir., 15
F. (2nd) 669; Bogardus v. Commission, 58 S.
Ct. 61, 82 L. Ed.-It was made in consideration
of the maintenance of the ferry service; it was
paid monthly; and its payment would not have
been continued from month to month if the service
had not been maintained. 'Bounties granted by
a government are never pure donations, but are
allowed either in consideration of services rendered or to be rendered, objects of public interest
to be obtained, production or manufacture to be
stimulated, or moral obligations to be recognized.'
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Allen v. Smith, 173 U. S. 389, 402, 19 S. Ct. 446,
451, 43 L. Ed. 741. ''
The problem is whether these "subsidies" or "premium prices'' are a part of the ''gross amount'' received
for Respondents' ores. There can be no question but
that such payments are not gifts by the Federal Government to the producers. The quid p~o quo for which
such premium payments were made, was the actual
production of the various metals for the Federal Government in the prosecution of the war. This is well
recognized by Respondents in the allegations of their
respective complaints wherein it is stated that these
payments were made by the National Government ''to
insure the maximum necessary production of essential
metal for use by the National Government in the waging
of war, to induce this plaintiff and other like industries
to enter upon an operation on behalf of the National
Government and its legitimate function of prosecuting
war". (The italics added.) The premium payments were
made for production of ore, to be used by the Federal
Government in its prosecution of the war, and are based
upon the recoverable metals normally recovered from
such ores. The amount paid by the Federal Government
at the time the ores are smelted or refined is made in
lieu of increasing the purchase price to the smelting or
refining companies, which, in turn, would correspondingly increase the purchase price upon the refined metals
and ultimately upon the finished products purchased by
the Federal Government. Just as in the case of Helvering v. Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Company, supra, "the
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amount received from the state for the maintenance of
the ferry was gain to the taxpayer; and it was gain
derived from the capital invested in the ferry and the
labor involved in it::; operation" so in the instant cases
the amounts received by Respondents from Metals Reserve Company was gain to Respondents arising out of
the production and disposal of their ores and formed
a part of the "gross amount received for or the gross
value of" such ores.
The Supreme Court of the United States has had
occasion to pass upon a rather similar situation to the
one here involved in the case of Texas and Pacific Railway Company v. United States, 286 U. S. 285, 52 S. Ct.
528, 76 L. gd. 1108. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 209 of the Transportation Act of 1920, the Federal
Government guaranteed to the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, ''a minimum operating revenue.'' Since
the actual operating revenue received from fares and
charges did not reach the amount guaranteed, the balance
was made up by a payment from the Federal Government. Such amounts were included by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue as part of the company's gross
income. The additional tax thus resulting was protested
on the ground that the ''guaranteed payment was not
income from operation of the railroads but was a subsidy"; that being a subsidy "the guaranteed payment
is not income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment." Chapter 18, 40 Stat. at L., 1057, 1065, provided
that the term "gross income" did not include "the
value of property acquired by gift.'' In speaking of the
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plan whereby the Government guaranteed the railroad
company a minimum operating revenue, the Supreme
Court stated:
"While the Government had either paid or
was obligated to pay just compensation for their
requisition, the amount if it was known to be
insufficient for rehabilitation of the roads as
privately owned and operated organizations.
Until rates could be adjusted to meet increased
expenses, loans be negotiated, and operating
forces realigned and reintegrated, the credit of
the carriers must by some means be re-established. Thus the Government had a real obligation, not readily susceptible of accurate measurement, to assist in the restoration of normal conditions. The purpose of the guaranty provision
was to stabilize the credit position of the roads
by assuring them a minimum operating income.
They were bound to operate their properties in
order to avail themselves of the Government's
proffer. Under the terms of the statute no sum
could be received save as a result of operation.
If the fruits of the employment of a road's
capital and labor should fall below a fixed minimum then the Government agreed to make up the
deficiency, and if the income were to exceed that
minimum the carrier bound itself to pay the excess
into the federal treasury. In the latter event the
carrier unquestionably would have been obligated
to pay income tax measured by actual earnings; in
the former, it ought not to be in a better position
than if it had earned the specified minimum.''
Concluding then that the amount received from
the Federal Government was just as much a part of the
income of the railroad company frorn its operations as
its fares and charges, the Supreme Court stated:
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"Clearly, then the amount paid to bring the
yield from operation up to the required minimum
was as much income from operation as were the
railroad's receipts from fares and charges. The
sums received under the act were not subsidies
or gifts-that is, contributions to the capital of
the railroads,-and this fact distinguishes cases
such as Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U. S. 628, 69
L. Ed. 1124, 45 S. Ct. 614, where the payments
were conditioned upon construction work performed. Here they were to be measured by a
deficiency in operating- income, and might be used
for the payment of dividends, of operating expenses, of capital charges, or for any other purpose within the corporate authority, just as any
other operating revenue might he applied. The
Government's payments were not in their nature
bounties, but an addition to a depleted operating
revenue consequent upon a federal activity.''
See also Boston Elevated Ry. Co. v. Commissioner
(C. C. A. 1st), 131 Fed. (2d) 161.
In the case of Baboquivari Cattle Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 9th), 135 F. (2d)
114, the court was concerned with the problem of determining whether monies received by the taxpayer from
the Federal Government pursuant to the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act constituted income for
the purpose of taxation. The court characterized the
payments as follows:
"It is plain that the moneys received were
not exempt as gifts under Sec. 22 (b) ( 3) of the
Revenue Act of 1936, 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev.
Acts, page 825; they were earned payments made
upon a consideration. On oral argument petitioner did not seriously contend that they were
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gifts. Its contention, in summary, is that the
payments were not income at all, but capital
subsidies. The taxpayer attempts to distinguish
between types of payments made under the Act,
those for inaction-as for refraining from production or for producing a limited amount only
of a given crop-being said by petitioner to he
classifiable as "income subsidies" because designed to supplement income; whereas subsidies
for positive outlays such as those made here
are said, on the authority of l'Jdwards v. Cuba
Railroad Co., 268 U. S. 628, 45 S. Ct. 614, 69
L. Ed., 1124, to he classifiable as 'capital subsidies.'
"We are not able to discover in the Act or in
the administrative practices of the Department of
Agriculture any justification for these nice distinctions. We think the pertinent regulations of
the Secretary afford no basis for them. Under
these regulations a farmer is not entitled to receive or retain a payment if he has pursued practices tending to defeat the conservation program.
Thus a beneficiary does not earn a payment
me.rely by making an improvement; he earns it
in part by compliance with conditions in respect
of the proper ttse of his land. For example, if
the utility of a range has been improved by the
building of a reservoir, the right to have or retain
the subsidy for the improvement would he defeated if the grower overgrazed his land or indulges in similar injurious practices.
"It is of little importance, we think, what
name be applied to the paymen.ts, whether they
be called 'subsidies' as insisted upon by the taxpayer, or 'benefits' as they were termed by the
Board. In either event they are within the broad
concept of income as that term is defined in Sec.
22(a) of the 1936 act. Consult Eisner v. Macom33

her, 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521,
9 A. L. R. 1570. No part of the sums paid to the
petitioner were required to be placed by him in
a particular account or fund. The payments were
not earmarked, nor was there any restriction
on their use. Petitioner was free to use the money
for any purpose it might see fit, as to defray
operating expenses or to pay dividends or to
purchase an automobile.''
The foregoing analysis of the court with respect
to the nature of the payments received by the taxpayer
from the Federal Government applies with equal vigor
to the premium payments involved in the instant matters. Nor does the fact that an income tax statute was
involved in the Baboquivari case, whereas in the instant
matters we are concerned with an occupation tax, affect
the reasoning of the court. If the monies received by
Respondents herein from the Federal Government constitute income to them and. not mere ''gifts'' as they
were characterized by the District Court, such income
must have been derived from a specific activity on the
part of the Mining Companies. This activity, of course,
was the production of ores-and more ores. The payments received were for the additional ores produced
for the benefit of the Federal Government. As such, the
premium payments constitute a part of the ''gross
amount received fo!' or gross value of" such metalliferous ores.
While none of the foregoing cases cited in support
of Appellants' position are directly in point as to both
the facts and issues involved, nevertheless the reasoning
and analysis of the question of law by the several courts
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illustrate the soundness of Appellants' position herein.
However, there has been one case decided involving
metal premium payments such as those received by the
Respondents herein. Klies vs. Linnane (Montana 1945)
15G P. (2nd) 183. That case determines that under the
provisions of the net proceeds statute of ~M on tan a,
premium payments are not a part of the "gross yield or
value in dollars and cents" of the minerals. Apparently
the Montana court adopts the theory advanced by the
District Court in the instant matters in determining the
premium payments to be "gifts" from the Federal Government. Notwithstanding that Metals Reserve Company, in its announcement stated that the price of overproduction metals would be 17 cents per pound for copper, 11 cents per pound for zinc and 91;4 cents per pound
for lead, the Montana Supreme Court states that "Metals
Reserve Company does not * * * increase the price of
the metal." We opine that the Montana court did not
have before it all the orders and pronouncements of the
Federal agencies, nor all of the facts and circumstances
hereinbefore set forth in Appellants' brief.
The court goes on to hold that the premium payments increase the "value of the enterprise by making
it more profitable" but do not increase the value of the
metals involved. We do not sec how such a distinction
in law or in fact can be made. The premium payments
are paid upon the production of copper, lead and zinc,
based upon a total purchase price of 17 cents per pound
for copper, 91;4 cents per pound for lead and 11 cents per
pound for zinc. The amount received from the Federal
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Government is just as much a part of the amount received for such ores as the amount paid by the smelter
or other refining- company. Both are paid for the production of such ore based upon the actual recoverable
metal content thereof, and are paid upon ores actually
received-by the smelting- company in the crude state
and by the Federal Government in the refined or finished
product.
We do not feel that the reasoning- of the Montana
court can be upheld. Nor does the opinion refer to any
cases as supporting- the analysis or reasoning- therein
contained.
There is also a definite differentiation between the
mining- tax statutes of the State of Utah and the miningtax statutes of the State of Montana. Whereas, in
Montana ''the annual net proceedg, of all mines and
mining- claims, shall be taxed as other personal property"
(italics added), in our state the Occupation Tax is
assessed upon the rig-ht of the respective mining companies to do business, such tax being based on the ''gross
amount" received by every mining company from its
ores. The title to Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1937,
imposing a mining- occupation tax, states that a tax
is to be imposed ''on all engaged in the business of
mining or producing metalliferous ores.''
Montana, too, has an occupation tax similar to
ours, but again the basis for determining the value of
the "gross yield" is entirely different. Section 2344-3,
Revised Codes of Montana, 1935, Annotated, defines
the ''total gross value'' of the product to be:
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'' * * * the market value of all merchantable
metals or mineral products extracted or recovered
thereby, as shown by the gross smelter returns
of such metals or mineral product in dollars and
cents, without any deductions for costs of smelting, reduction or treatment, or otherwise, based
upon the ave.rage quotations of the price of such
tnetals, or mineral products, in the city of New
York, as evidenced by some established authority
or market report such as the Engineering and
Mining Journal of New York City, or other standard publications, giving the market reports during the calendar year immediately preceding.''
(Italics added.)
In the case of State ex rel Snidow et al v. State
Board of Equalization et al, 93 Mont. 19, 25, 17 P (2d)
68, 77, the Supreme Court held:
''In fixing the market value of zinc in Montana, based upon the price of the metal in St.
Louis, the board clearly violated the law, for
the statute requires the New York price to be
taken as a basis, and that price shows a differential of 35 cents per pound between St. Louis
and New York.''
We find no such statutes or decisions in our state
with respect to our mining occupation tax.
ARGUMENT II
Respondents' final position, which was apparently
adopted by the District Court also, is that the inclusion
of the premium payments here involved in the "gross
amount'' received for the ores of the respective Mining
Companies constitutes a seizure of monies paid by the
National Government in the interest of national defense
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and is a direct and substantial interference with and
burden upon the National Government; that said tax
is in violation of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and Section 7 of Article
I of the Constitution of Utah. In the case of Helvering
v. Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Co., supra, involving the
taxation of monies paid to the Ferry Company by the
State of Maryland, it was contended that such payments
were exempt from taxation because "a contribution
by the state toward the maintenance of the public ferry.''
The court rejected such contention in the following
language:
''On the second question, there can be no
question hut that the operation of a public ferry
as a link in the state highway system is a proper
function of the state and that the proceeds of
such operation by the state itself would not be
subject to the Federal income tax (Jamestown &
Newport Ferry Co. v. Commissioner, 1 Cir., 41 F.
(2d) 920); but it by no means follows that the
income of a private corporation engaged in operating such a ferry would not be subject to such
tax. Cf. Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax
Commission of :Maryland, 28a U. S. 291, 293, 51
S. Ct. 4i34, 435, 75 L. Ed. 1042; Broad River
Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178, 181, 53 S.
Ct. :326, 327, 77 L. Ed. 685; South Carolina Power
Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission D. C.,
52 F. (2d) 515, 526. Nor is the payment made
by the state to a private corporation necessarily
exempt from such tax because made as compensation or part compensation for a service
which the state itself might have performed.
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46
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S. Ct. 172, 174, 70 L. J1Jd. 384; Underwood v.
Commissioner, 4 Cir., 56 F. (2d) 67.
''The taxpayer here was a private corporation engaged in the operation of a public ferry.
The greater part of its income was derived from
tolls collected from vehicles and passengers transported. The subsidy paid by the state increased
its annual income in the same manner as its
income would have been increased by a contract
entered into with the state for the performance
of any other public service; and the tax was
imposed without discrimination as to whether
its income was derived from charges made to
private individuals or from the state subsidy.
Such tax cannot be said, in the light of the facts
to which we have adverted, to impair in any
substantial manner taxpayer's ability to discharge
its obligations to the state or the state's ability
to procure the services of private individuals to
aid in the undertaking.''
The leading case on this subject is James vs. Dravo
Contracting Company, 302 U. S. 1i}4, 58 S. Ct. 208,
82 L. Ed. 155, 114 A. L. R. 318. There the State of
West Virginia, under an occu,pation tax statute imposing a tax of 2 per cent upon the ''gross income of the
business'' of any person engaged in the state in the
business of contracting, included in taxpayer's "gross
income'' the amounts received by him from the Federal
Government for the construction of locks and dams upon
Federal property in the State of West Virginia. The
Supreme Court of the United States in holding such
tax valid stated:
''The tax is not laid upon the Government,
its property or officers. Dobbins v. Commission39

ers, 16 Pet. 435, 449, 450.
"The tax is not laid upon an instrumentality
of the Government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
~Wheat. i316; Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
9 '\Vheat. 738; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S.
501; Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S.
374; Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S.
341; New York ex rel Rogers v. Graves, 299
U. S. 401. Hespondent is an independent contractor. The tax is non-discriminatory."
Answering the contention of the taxpayer that the
tax inc1 eased the cof"t to the government of the services
rendered, the court said :
"But if it be assumed that the gross receipts
tax may increase the cost to the Government,
that fact would not invalidate the tax. With
respect to that effect, a tax on the contractor's
gross receipts would not differ from a tax on
the contractor's property and equipment necessarily used in the performance of the contract.
Concededly, such a tax may validly be laid.''
See also Alabama vs. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1,
------ S. Ct. ______ , 86 L. F~d. 3, (involving state sales tax);
Fidelity & Deposit Company vs. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S.
319 (involving a tax upon the gross premiums received
by a company where there were receipts derived from
the Federal Government).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submit:
The amounts received by Respondents from Metals
Reserve Company were properly included as a pa.rt of
the "gross amount received for or gross value of" the
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ores produced and sold under the statutes of Utah and
the inclusion of such premium payments did not violate
the provisions of either the Federal or State Constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILJ<JS,
Attorney General
ZAR E. HAYEJS,
Assistant Attorney General
W. L. SKANCHY,
WAYNT<J L. CHR1STOF'FERST<JN,
State Tax Commission Attorneys
Atto.rneys for Appellants.
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